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Introduction 
 
Works of literature represent stories, characters and events: these are the contents of 
a work. Often, the contents of literary works are fictional, however, it is just as 
characteristic of works of literature that these contents are narrated in a distinct style 
of writing, in an author’s distinct literary ‘voice’. In this paper, I consider whether 
works of literature might represent something over and above their fictional 
contents in virtue of their style alone, and what consequences this might have for 
our thinking about aesthetic education. Both of these concerns—with what works of 
art represent and what kind of knowledge they make available to us—have been 
central to recent analytic philosophy of art, however, while I will pay due attention 
to these debates, my main route into the question will not be through philosophy but 
by means of considering Virginia Woolf's writing on the modernist break with 
earlier stylistic conventions. Introducing the question in the context of Woolf’s 
writings will take up section 1 of this paper. In section 2, I will formulate a theory 
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of stylistic representation inspired by some of Woolf’s essays. According to this 
view, a literary style represents a cognitive disposition: a distinct, dispositionally 
defined cognitive habit of making sense of the world. In section 3 I will compare 
this theory with some possible contenders drawn from analytic philosophy of art, 
and in section 4 I outline how such a theory might help us evaluate innovations in 
literary style in terms of the kind of aesthetic education they make available to the 
reader. In this way, I suggest we may read Woolf’s remarks on the modernist 
experiment in literary style as preliminary work for a theory of how innovations in 
style make new kinds of understanding available to the reader. 
 
1. The Edwardians and the Georgians: Virginia Woolf and Literary Style 
 
Let me begin by considering a short excerpt from Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway. 
This is the third paragraph into the novel, after we learn that Mrs. Dalloway decided 
to go buy the flowers herself. 
 
What a lark! What a plunge! For so it had always seemed to her, when, with a little 
squeak of the hinges, which she could hear now, she had burst open the French 
windows and plunged at Bourton into the open air. How fresh, how calm, stiller than 
this of course, the air was in the early morning; like the flap of a wave; the kiss of a 
wave; chill and sharp and yet (for a girl of eighteen as she then was) solemn, feeling as 
she did, standing there at the open window, that something awful was about to happen; 
looking at the flowers, at the trees with the smoke winding off them and the rooks 
rising, falling; standing and looking until Peter Walsh said, “Musing among the 
vegetables?”—was that it?—“I prefer men to cauliflowers”—was that it?1 
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The content of the passage is not immediately clear, but the reader soon realises it is 
about a memory that Clarissa Dalloway had as she left her home. She remembered a 
conversation she had when she was a girl of eighteen, back in the countryside, at 
Bourton. What I want to draw attention too, however, is not the content but the 
literary style of the passage. This style, it seems, communicates something in 
addition to the content; indeed, the novel as a whole, written in Woolf’s pioneering 
stream of consciousness style, seems to communicate something about the nature of 
thought processes. Our thoughts appear less fixed, less deliberate and less 
predictable as we might have hitherto considered them to be. But what kind of 
representation is this? How can a choice of style represent something as general as 
the psychology of human thoughts? 
 This is the question I propose to address in this paper: is there such a thing as 
representation in virtue of literary style, and what kind of representation is it? We 
should say, first of all, a bit more about what style is. We may begin such a 
description by drawing a contrast between style and content.  While literary content 
has to do with what is fictionally the case in the work, style has to do with how that 
content is narrated. More precisely, we might describe style as the property of the 
literary text, which is recognizable across a given work through a consistent use of 
motifs, themes, techniques, imagery, word choice, point of view, emphasis, 
grammar, punctuation, and other literary devices. It would pay to note that this 
notion of style might not be completely separable from content. For example, the 
imagery and motifs of magical realism might necessitate that certain kinds of 
extraordinary things tend to be fictionally the case in works written in that style. 
Nevertheless, it seems possible to at least in principle draw a distinction between 
style and content: the same content can be depicted in a variety of styles. 
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 In Anglophone aesthetics, the idea that works of art represent something beyond 
their fictional contents, and that they represent that something in virtue of their 
style, has been around since at least Arthur Danto’s The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace. Danto suggested, famously, that unlike mere representations works 
of art ‘use the means of representation in a way that is not exhaustively specified 
when one has exhaustively specified what is being represented.’2 This constitutes 
the artistic style of the work, and is a way for an artist to express some meaning in 
addition to what is being represented.3 However, this suggestion has since then 
mostly been dropped from the philosophical agenda. Sporadically, aestheticians 
have addressed related questions: what is the concept of style?4 is style part of the 
definition of art, and do only artworks have styles? 5 which styles of pictorial 
depiction are realistic?6 However, there has been little debate about the puzzle 
expressed by Danto’s distinction between artworks and mere representations. 
Artworks can communicate something over and above their fictional contents, and 
they seem to do so in virtue of their style. How to characterize this kind of 
representation is the question I will tackle here, though I will limit my debate to 
literary style rather than the visual arts discussed by Danto. I will start not by 
enumerating available positions within analytic philosophy, but by reconstructing 
what I believe to be an interesting position on the subject found elsewhere, in the 
essayistic writings of Virginia Woolf herself. I will return to analytic philosophy of 
art in section 3, when I will consider Woolf’s views side by side with some more 
recent philosophical suggestions as to the nature of literary style. 
 In several of her essays written in the early 1920s,7 Virginia Woolf tries to 
pinpoint what it is that distinguishes her generation of British writers from their 
predecessors. The term ‘modernism’ is not yet available to Woolf, who instead 
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speaks of two camps: the Edwardians, among whom she counts Arnold Bennett, 
John Galsworthy and H.G. Wells; and the Georgians, among whom she counts E.M. 
Forster, D.H. Lawrence, Lytton Strachey, James Joyce, T.S. Eliot, and, we may 
presume, herself.8 Woolf’s analysis of the difference between the groups comes 
across particularly well in the essay ‘Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown.’ Here, in a 
characteristic mixture of critical reflection and fictional narrative, she describes a 
seemingly insignificant encounter on the train, a short exchange between an elderly 
woman and a middle-aged man. Woolf then imagines a poetic contest between the 
Edwardians and the Georgians; the task is to describe the old lady, who is given the 
every(wo)man name Mrs. Brown. This seemingly most elementary of a novelist’s 
tasks, to recount a simple everyday encounter, becomes the stomping ground on 
which the two movements will battle out what is artistically at stake. 
 Two themes in Woolf’s essay are of particular relevance to our question. The 
first is that what the two generations represent differently is something that Woolf 
variably refers to as ‘human character’ or ‘human nature.’ This is what Mrs. Brown 
stands for: from one train stop to the next, ‘Mrs. Brown is eternal, Mrs. Brown is 
human nature, […], it is the novelists who get in and out.’9 The task for the contest 
is then not to describe this or that particular person, but something more general and 
of deeper significance. The second important theme is that the distinction between 
the two camps is not a difference in the represented fictional contents, but a 
difference in style. It is not that Edwardians and Georgians explore radically 
different subjects: it is not that the former write about one social class, and the latter 
about another; or that the former write about fantastical voyages, and the latter 
about everyday occurrences. The difference is rather in what Woolf calls ‘a set of 
literary conventions’ or ‘tools’ – what we might term ‘style.’10 In short, we have 
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here Woolf formulating a question that is very similar to our own: how does a 
difference in literary style allow an author to represent something of considerable 
generality, in this case something about human nature? 
 Before we give more attention to the question itself, though, let us briefly 
consider the differences between the Edwardian and Georgian styles. The 
Edwardian writers, according to Woolf, concentrate in their style of writing chiefly 
on the creation of contrasting, strongly delineated fictional personas. In part, this is 
achieved with attention to the odd and the particular: ‘an English writer,’ she writes 
presumably with the Edwardians in mind, ‘would make the old lady into a 
‘character’; he would bring out her oddities and mannerisms; her buttons and 
wrinkles; her ribbons and warts; her personality would dominate the book.’11 The 
creation of such a believable character is, as Arnold Bennett writes in a passage 
quoted by Woolf, the foremost task of the novelist.12 In doing so, Edwardians also 
rely on a great deal of description and realistic detail. Woolf imagines Mr. Bennett’s 
instructions to a young novelist: ‘Begin by saying that her father kept a shop in 
Harrogate. Ascertain the rent. Ascertain the wages of shop assistants in the year 
1878. Discover what her mother died of. Describe cancer. Describe calico. 
Describe….’13 The Edwardian style is highly descriptive, and focuses on social 
facts, fixed psychological characteristics and material circumstances of people. 
Elsewhere Woolf calls this kind of style ‘materialism.’14  
 The Georgian, modernist style breaks with both the creation of personnas and 
with the detailed description of material facts (both of which, one can notice, are 
absent from the passage quoted from Mrs. Dalloway). Woolf is rather more reticent 
in describing the Georgian style, but comes closest to articulating what it is like 
when she writes about what the Edwardians have overlooked. This is what is absent 
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from materialism: ‘You have overheard scraps of talk that filled you with 
amazement. You have gone to bed at night bewildered by the complexity of your 
feelings. In one day thousands of ideas have coursed through your brains; thousands 
of emotions have met, collided, and disappeared in astonishing disorder.’15 What 
replaces the Edwardian pedantry then, to venture an interpretation, is Woolf’s own 
emphasis on the stream of consciousness, which she would perfect not in Mrs 
Brown but in Mrs Dalloway. Her style emphasies colliding, unconnected 
impressions; it uses long sentences separated by semicolons, which sometimes 
change their subject matter midway; it contains unexpected mixing of action and 
reminiscence of her characters; there is little description of social fact or of fixed 
psychological characteristics.  
 Let us, for now, then take this to be the relevant distinction. On one hand, we 
have the Edwardian style with creation of particular, contrasting personalities and 
attention to materialist detail; on the other, we have the Georgian style which does 
away with both of these features, and replaces them with a more meandering, 
stream of consciousness manner. Let us again emphasize that the relevant 
difference does not have to do with fictional content. It is not as if Arnold Bennett 
could not have written, within the confines of his style, that a character of his had a 
‘disjointed and meandering consciousness.’ It is not that Virginia Woolf could not 
have included a few facts about the warts, buttons, ribbons and servants’ wages in 
Mrs. Dalloway. The difference is in the manner and in the emphasis with which 
each writer would approach these elements of the fiction. This is precisely the 
suggestion that the example of Mrs. Brown seems to set up. Two writers of 
different camps could describe the same woman on the train; they could even 
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include the same facts about her personality, situation and appearance, and would 
still arrive at different results in virtue of their different styles.16 
 With this difference in mind we can now turn to Woolf’s other suggestion, 
which is that what each style represents differently is something about human 
nature. This could well strike one as a genuinely puzzling suggestion. How could a 
mere difference in style represent something different about human nature? 
Presumably, a view about human nature would have to be expressed with a general 
propositional statement. The two literary camps would have to put forward two 
mutually exclusive statements of the form ‘It is a fact about human nature that...’; 
but a difference in style seems to have nothing do do with such statements. Further, 
the relevant difference is also not a difference in content. It is not the case that in 
Edwardian novels all characters exemplify one kind of human nature, and in 
Georgian novels they exemplify some other kind. It is not that humans are shown to 
have one kind of psychology in Edwardian novels, and a radically different one in 
Georgian novels; in fact, both camps can describe people in similar situations and 
with similar concerns. The relevant difference has to do with emphasis and 
structure, with how these characters are represented in a particular narrative style, 
not with what they are represented to be like. So how could this sort of difference 
represent something different about human nature? 
 Woolf’s writings, I now want to suggest, not only pose this question but offer an 
interesting answer to it. The passage that most clearly articulates her view comes 
from a less well-known essay, David Copperfield. Here, Woolf is discussing 
Dickens rather than the Edwardians or the Georgians, but to the extent that she 
takes Dickens to be a formative influence on the Edwardians, the passage is very 
telling. It is worth quoting at some length: 
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 [W]hile we are under their spell, these great geniuses [writers of Dickens’ stature] 
make us see the world any shape they choose. We remodel our psychological 
geography when we read Dickens; we forget that we have ever felt the delights of 
solitude or observed with wonder the intricate emotions of our friends, or 
luxuriated in beauty of nature. What we remember is the ardour, the excitement, the 
humour, the oddity of people’s characters; the smell and savour and soot of 
London; the incredible coincidences which hook the most remote lives together; 
the city, the law courts; this man’s nose, that man’s limp; […] And the fecundity 
and apparent irreflectiveness have a strange effect. They make creators of us, and 
not merely readers and spectators.17 
 Here Woolf seems to make a connection between literary achievement and the 
psychological effect literature has on the reader. She describes Dickens as someone 
who can ‘remodel our psychological geography.’ In describing this process as 
having to do with making ‘creators of us’ rather than merely ‘readers and 
spectators’, Woolf could be taken to point to the familiar effect of being able to 
look up from an absorbing work of literature, and see the world as modelled on it. 
When we read Dickens, for example, we can immediately make sense of our own 
environment in that peculiar Dickensian way: we can consider the people we know 
in terms of their pronounced physical and character traits; consider the places we 
are familiar with in terms of their excitement, oddities, and ardour. At the same 
time, certain other aspects of our lives fade into the background: we forget ‘the 
intricate emotions of our friends’. An engrossing literary style, then, can be said to 
lead its reader to a certain set of cognitive habits, and hold her there. This is the 
‘spell’ Woolf speaks of; the ability of writers to ‘make us see the world any shape 
they choose.’ 
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 If we were to connect this analysis of literary achievement to Woolf’s 
discussion of differing representations of human nature, we might get clearer on 
why Woolf thinks a change in literary style in early 20th Century marks such an 
important difference. Works of literature do not, for Woolf, represent different sets 
of general propositions or theories about human nature. Instead, a literary style 
represents a certain cognitive habit: a way of picking out certain features of 
personality as more salient than others, of privileging certain kinds of detail over 
others, of interpreting people’s motivations and actions in some ways but not 
others. According to Woolf, the long realist tradition running from Dickens to 
Bennett privileged one such way of making sense of others – in terms of people’s 
social status and pronounced character traits – and this exercised a tremendous 
influence over how the reading public made sense of their lives.18 To remodel that 
way of thinking, to upset that ossified ‘psychological geography’, the task of 
Woolf’s own generation was to invent a new style of writing. 
 While there is some distance to be walked from an exegesis of Woolf’s writings 
to a defensible philosophical position, I hope the case has been made that it would 
be worthwhile to go that distance. In the next section, I will return to that initial 
philosophical question – how can works of art represent something in virtue of their 
style? – and try and offer an answer in light of Woolf’s remarks.  
 
2. A Woolfian theory of stylistic representation 
 
I have opened this discussion with the suggestion, taken from Danto, that works of 
art use the means of representation in a way that goes beyond the representation of 
their fictional contents. This use constitutes the artwork’s style, and such style may 
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by itself represent something in addition to the fictional contents. In relation to this 
thought, I now want to canvass two suggestions on the basis of Woolf’s writings. 
The first is a suggestion about the form that philosophical argument about stylistic 
representation should take; the second contains a particular theory of stylistic 
representation. 
 First, let us try to give a more definite form to the suggestion that we think 
about literary style as a kind of representation. Woolf, as we saw, thinks of the 
difference in style as a difference in opinion: the strikingly innovative style of the 
Georgians – as seen, for example, in Woolf’s own Mrs. Dalloway – is not just some 
strange new affectation; it has to do with the endeavour of the new generation to 
represent human nature in a new way. However, here arises a puzzle. On the one 
hand, Woolf’s suggestion seems interpretatively plausible: it seems prima facie 
plausible to say that the style of Mrs. Dalloway represents human nature in a 
different way than the style of Edwardian literature represents it to be. The 
disjointed, fluid style of Mrs. Dalloway, as can be seen in the passage I quoted at 
the beginning of the paper, appears to suggest a human nature that is unstable and 
uncertain rather than determined by fixed character traits. On the other hand, 
however, the more we try to specify what it is exactly that the style of the novel 
represents about human nature, the more we need to exert ourselves interpretatively. 
What exactly is being represented? Is it a certain fact about human nature? Is it 
certain properties of the human psyche? Is it that these properties are predicated of 
a certain fictional person or of the human genus in general? And, given that the 
words ‘human nature’ are quite absent from the relevant passage of Mrs. Dalloway, 
how do we know that it is something about human nature that the style represents? 
None of this is quite clear. 
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 The puzzle then is that if we try to express in propositional form what a given 
style represents, we hit upon a certain indeterminacy. Perhaps this indeterminacy 
might be a good reason to drop the talk of representation altogether; it might lead us 
to dismiss Woolf’s suggestion that different styles represent different views on 
human nature as pointing towards something hopelessly vague. For now, however, I 
want to see what happens if we take this indeterminacy instead to be something that 
an adequate theory of stylistic representation needs to explain. 
 Let me make this a bit clearer by comparing stylistic representation to other 
kinds of representation we study in aesthetics, such as pictorial depiction. Theories 
of pictorial depiction take it as their starting point that the pictorial content – that 
which is represented by a picture – is by and large determinate. Of course, there are 
ambiguous pictures like the duck-rabbit but most pictures are not like that. It is 
unproblematic that George Stubb’s Whistlejacket represents a brown horse standing 
on its hind legs. What different theories of depiction tend to focus on primarily is 
not what pictures represent, but the relevant relation, which takes us from the 
pictorial surface to some determinate pictorial content. For example, some theories 
will claim Whistlejacket represents a horse because it resembles a horse in some 
restricted sense;19 others that the picture represents a horse because it engages the 
perceptual mechanisms, which allow us to recognize horses.20 By contrast, the 
problem with stylistic representation occurs already a step earlier: the content, 
which the text stylistically represents, is itself an open question.  
 What seems to follow from this is that a theory of stylistic representation has a 
double task. First it needs to show what it is that a given style represents. A style, to 
reiterate, is a certain property of the text: a set of emphases, imagery, word choice, 
technique, and so on, which is recognizable across a given work. The chief puzzle 
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for a theory of stylistic representation is that what some such a style represents 
seems only partially determinate. Only once a theory of stylistic representation has 
adequately captured what it is that a style can represent, can it proceed to specify 
what the relevant representational relation is; that is, what relation takes us from the 
literary text to the stylistically represented content. This framework is certainly 
experimental, and the tenability of it is yet to be demonstrated. What I want to do 
now is to formulate a theory of stylistic representation that fits this framework, and 
which I will derive from Woolf’s writings on style. 
 The key suggestion I want to make on the basis of Woolf’s essays is that a 
literary style represents a particular set of cognitive dispositions. As we saw, 
according to Woolf, the highly descriptive Edwardian style and the stream of 
consciousness Georgian style each represent human nature differently. However, 
they do not do so by means of a theory of human nature. A given style does not 
represent some set of propositions, but simply a way of thinking: what Woolf terms 
our ‘psychological geography.’ What the Edwardian and the Georgian style 
represent differently – to repeat – is a way of organizing information about people, 
a way of interpreting the reasons and causes behind their actions, a way of 
discriminating between important and unimportant facts about their personalities. 
Strictly speaking, then, it would be erroneous to say that a style represents some 
statement about human nature. Instead, a style represents a certain way of 
organizing information and making sense of people’s natures. It represents a 
cognitive disposition that the reader may want to adopt. 
 Perhaps we can make this idea clearer by looking at other cases in philosophy 
where the distinction between propositional attitudes and cognitive dispositions has 
been made. One such case would be Gareth Evans’ influential characterization of 
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our tacit knowledge of the grammar of natural languages in terms of cognitive 
dispositions.21 What is curious about our knowledge of natural languages is that we 
seem to understand a potentially infinite number of sentences. To explain this fact, 
we can either - implausibly - attribute to speakers the knowledge of an infinite 
number of sentence-meanings; or we can - more plausibly - attribute to speakers the 
knowledge of compositional axioms of the language, which allow them to form and 
understand new sentences. Evans proposed that we think of such tacit knowledge as 
non-propositional. A competent speaker cannot be expected to articulate or even 
assent to the relevant axioms expressed as propositions. In addition, unlike with 
genuine beliefs, the speaker’s knowledge of compositional axioms cannot be 
combined with other speaker’s beliefs to yield further beliefs: our knowledge of 
compositional axioms does not appear to be at the disposal of our cognitive projects 
in the same way as our genuine propositional beliefs are.22 This lead Evans to 
conclude that our knowledge of these axioms is importantly subdoxastic. When we 
ascribe to a speaker the knowledge of a compositional axiom, we are simply 
ascribing to her a dispositional state: she is merely disposed to use language in a 
certain way.23 I will not here go into the details of Evans’ argument. For our 
purposes it suffices that the contrast between tacit knowledge of compositional 
axioms and propositional attitudes is clear enough, and that the characterisation of 
the former in terms of cognitive dispositions, rather than in terms of propositional 
attitudes, is intuitively appealing. Then we may think of the contents that literary 
styles represent as similarly subdoxastic. A style represents a set of cognitive 
dispositions: a general modus operandi of gathering, organizing, and responding to 
information. 
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 The suggestion that a literary style represents a set of subdoxastic cognitive 
dispositions, rather than a set of propositions, I think, allows us to shine some light 
on the apparent indeterminacy of what it is that a literary style represents. Just as we 
may grasp new languages or dialects without propositionally grasping the axioms 
specifying their rules of composition, we may grasp the cognitive disposition of 
organizing information represented by Woolf’s style, without being able to put our 
finger precisely on what axioms underlie that disposition. We can, of course, have a 
go at specifying such axioms with some level of accuracy. We might describe the 
disposition represented by Woolf’s style as being governed by some axiom such as 
‘do not search for fixed character traits, but pay attention to people’s associative 
thought processes’, etc. Arguably this is the sort of project we engage with when we 
interpret what a given style is about. However, it is not the task of the literary writer 
to provide some such description of the cognitive dispositions she is representing by 
her style. Precisely what stylistic representation enables is to represent some such 
interesting new disposition without laying out the axioms. Similarly, the reader may 
recognize and be surprised or fascinated or attracted by the represented disposition 
without attempting to propositionally unlock the axioms that underlie it. We do not 
need to engage in some heavy-duty interpreting to be captivated by the way of 
making sense of others that Woolf’s writing style represents. 
 Now we have some sense of what is being represented by a literary style: a set 
of cognitive dispositions. This, I propose, is how we should understand Woolf’s 
suggestion that great literary authors shape our ‘psychological geography.’ An 
achievement of stylistic innovation has to do, at least in part, with succeeding in 
putting forward a representation of an intriguing new way of making sense of 
information. Accordingly, the achievement of Woolf’s own modernist innovations 
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in style can be appraised along these lines: it represents a way of making sense of 
others that privileges aspects of human nature previously overlooked.   
 As I argue in the next section, such a theory of stylistic representation could 
make for an exciting addition to the extant philosophical writings on literary style. 
However, it ought to be said that as a theory of stylistic representation, it is so far 
only part-complete. We now have an idea of what a literary style represents – a set 
of cognitive dispositions – but what remains to be established is how this happens. 
How do we get from reading a text with certain stylistic properties to a 
representation of a cognitive disposition? To illustrate by an analogy, a question 
that gets asked in theories of pictorial representation is: what relation takes us from 
the shapes on the pictorial surface to some depicted content? This relation is 
sometimes specified in terms of a necessary condition for a picture to depict some 
content: a picture M pictorially depicts some content N only if relation R obtains 
between M and N. Philosophers have offered different candidates for R: for 
example, R is sometimes theorised as some restricted resemblance relation between 
M and N (resemblance theories of depiction), or some relation that obtains between 
M and N in virtue of human perceptual mechanisms (recognitional theories of 
depiction).24 An analogous question for literary style would then be: what is the 
relation that obtains between a text written in a certain style and a set of cognitive 
dispositions?  
 I merely gesture at this issue as something that may be considered in the course 
of a further investigation. However, here too, I think, Woolf’s writings may be of 
use. As said above, Woolf stresses the psychological effect that a literary style has 
on our way of thinking: writers ‘make creators of us.’ We can, after reading a few 
passages of Dickens, look away from the novel, and consider our academic 
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colleagues as a comical and motley bunch with pronounced personal characteristics. 
We can, after a few pages of Woolf, consider them more sympathetically and 
plastically, less as fixed types. It might be that this effect is precisely the 
representational relation we are after. A given style S, we might venture to say, 
represents a set of cognitive dispositions D only if S gets the reader to temporarily 
share D. This sort of thesis might command some plausibility in the light of the 
research on anchoring biases that is being done in cognitive psychology. As this 
work has shown, we are highly susceptible to adjusting our patterns of judgement 
depending on what kind of information we receive immediately prior to making a 
judgement.25 Literary style might work in a similar way: ‘anchoring’ our patterns of 
thought in a way that we can transfer to real life. A literary style represents a 
disposition that it habituates its readers to. 
 This is merely a further suggestion, though, which we need not accept in order 
to hold onto the more robust thesis that literary styles represent sets of cognitive 
dispositions. We may accept this thesis while leaving it open as to how exactly a 
literary style represents these dispositions. In the last section, I consider possible 
rivals to this view. As not much has been written specifically on the notion of 
stylistic representation, I look to related philosophical writings – on the cognitive 
value of art, definition of style, and expression – to construct a few possible 
alternatives. 
  
3. Some alternatives 
 
The first alternative might be to suggest that a work, in virtue of its style, does not 
represent a cognitive disposition but content in propositional form. We might get 
 18 
 
inspiration for this view from James Young’s position on the cognitive value of art. 
Young argues that works of art engage in what he terms ‘illustrative 
demonstration’: by characteristically artistic means of exaggeration, comparison, 
and so on, works of art place the reader into a perspective from which some truth 
becomes apparent.26 One type of knowledge we gain in this way, according to 
Young, is propositional knowledge. For example, he suggests that Jane Austen’s 
Emma puts the reader in a perspective from which it becomes apparent that ‘it is 
dangerous to delight in making a sport of one’s acquaintances’.27 Now, if we were 
to apply this view to style and apply it to the passage from Mrs. Dalloway, we could 
formulate a useful point of contrast to the view that a style represents cognitive 
dispositions. The passage, we could say, does not stylistically represent a cognitive 
disposition, but rather, by putting the reader into a particular perspective, 
illustratively demonstrates some general thesis. For example, we could say the 
passage puts the reader into a perspective from which a general proposition such as 
‘people’s thought processes are meandering and unstable rather than fixed by stable 
character traits’ becomes apparent.  
 I am not suggesting that Young would subscribe to such an interpretation of the 
passage from Mrs. Dalloway, since, as said, his theory concerns cognitive value of 
art as opposed to literary style as such. However, for the sake of drawing a contrast 
with the theory of stylistic representation outlined in the previous section, it seems 
important to note why it would be implausible to say that a literary style represents 
some propositional content. This suggestion seems to completely misrepresent the 
phenomenology of reading a stylistically distinct passage such as the one from Mrs. 
Dalloway. Nothing quite as distinct as some general thesis is formed before us 
while we read. Additionally, as I discussed above, if we do attempt to formulate 
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some general thesis that the style represents, such statements often seem elusive and 
requiring interpretative strain. To suggest on the contrary that a writing style clearly 
represents some definite proposition seems to comically misrepresent the 
experience of reading. While reading, we do not exclaim, passage by passage: ‘aha! 
I see what this is saying! People’s thought processes are not fixed but meandering!’ 
A remarkable style does not put before us some remarkable general statement, but a 
remarkable way of making sense of the word; that is, to put it in technical terms I 
have been employing, a remarkable cognitive disposition. 
 The second suggestion that I want to consider would be that a literary style does 
not represent some cognitive disposition, but rather expresses the author’s 
personality, mental state or attitude. Here the important distinction is about who 
possesses the said disposition. My view is that a style represents a cognitive 
disposition simpliciter, whereas this alternative view would hold that the disposition 
– or indeed a personality, some mental state or attitude – is represented distinctly as 
belonging to the author. Perhaps the best place to look for such a view is Jenefer 
Robinson’s proposal that literary style is an ‘expression of [the author’s] 
personality, or, more accurately, of the personality she seems to have.’28 Just as the 
way of dress or the way of behaving at a party may be said to express a personality 
trait – where by saying that behaviour ‘expresses’ a personality trait we mean that it 
both exhibits and is caused by that trait29 - the real or implied author’s literary style 
expresses her personality.30 We could suggest, then, that what really goes on in the 
passage in Mrs. Dalloway is an expression of Woolf’s particular personality, mental 
state or attitude towards life. 
 Robinson’s suggestions do not arise out of an attempt to construct a theory of 
stylistic representation, but out of an attempt to conceptually define style, especially 
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to establish what distinguishes an artist’s individual style vis-à-vis a general style of 
an art historical movement.31 I do not mean to comment on the aptitude of her 
proposal for settling that question. However, if we were to follow Robinson’s view 
to suggest in addition that stylistic representation in works of literature represents 
an author’s own psychological states, as opposed to some cognitive disposition 
simpliciter, I think this would yield rather implausible consequences. Virginia 
Woolf, as we saw, did not merely attempt to express some inner anxiety of hers, but 
attempted to open her readers’ minds to how she felt human nature should be 
perceived, in general. Certainly, some writers might develop a particular style in 
order to showcase what they take to be an intriguing personality – either a 
character’s or their own – perhaps in a similar way that other people express 
themselves through the style of their dress. However, I think this describes a special 
rather than the general case. Many if not most literary writers are concerned with 
developing ways of thinking about the world, which do not merely express a 
character trait, but which they take to be models for thinking that others too can 
benefit from. Woolf for one certainly saw herself as participating in the common 
intellectual project of making sense of our environment – a project that 
philosophers too participate in – and it would be unfortunate if we had to say that 
all she managed to express through her innovative style was her particular character 
traits. 
 The third view I should consider is one I suspect not many philosophers hold 
anymore, but that is so canonical it should at least be mentioned. This is Nelson 
Goodman’s theory of expression as metaphorical exemplification. Danto considers 
Goodman’s view specifically in connection to style, though he does not fully 
develop this thought: 
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It might be possible to work our way concentrically outward from the concept of 
rhetoric, through the concept of expression, to the comprehensive concept of style, if 
Meyer Shapiro is right that style makes reference to “an overall quality which we may 
call ‘expression,’” and if Nelson Goodman is right that expression is metaphorical 
exemplification.32 
According to Goodman, what is expressed by a work of art W is a certain property 
P when W metaphorically exemplifies P: that is, when W metaphorically possesses 
P, and also refers to P in virtue of that relation.33 By means of expression, works of 
art can represent properties they do not literally possess. For example, pictures can 
express feelings (sad, jubilant), properties of sound (melodious, dissonant) or of 
temperature (warm, cold). Along these lines, one could perhaps claim that literary 
styles also express such properties.34 Here are some suggestions. Perhaps we could 
say that Woolf’s style expresses properties like meandering or disjointed. 
Alternatively, we could say that the style expresses the properties that a meandering 
and disjointed thought process possesses. How would such views compare to the 
one I have been advocating? 
 It seems plausible to me to suggest that styles metaphorically possess certain 
features: that Woolf’s style, for example, can be said to be disjointed or 
meandering. Other styles might be described as bleak, clinical, flowery, enthusiastic 
– all of which might be parsed as cases of metaphorical possession. However, I am 
not sure that it is helpful to suggest that a style also refers to these properties. First, 
it seems implausible to suggest that Woolf’s style refers to the literal properties of 
being disjointed or meandering: properties that chains or rivers can have. While 
there might be some intuitive pull to saying that a (metaphorically) warm abstract 
painting refers to (literal) warmth, in a way that a tailor’s swatch refers to a colour, I 
think there is no similar intuitive pull to saying that Woolf’s style refers to some 
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property a river or a chain might have. A flowery style similarly does not refer to 
flowers; a clinical style does not refer to clinics. Goodman’s theory seems 
somewhat applicable to abstract painting or some music, but seems to be less so in 
the case of literary style.  
 To reiterate, I do not think that any of the philosophers I have here mentioned 
hold a theory of stylistic representation, and I do not think my arguments here 
necessarily apply against other theories they do hold, namely, theories about the 
definition of style, cognitive value or expression. I merely tried to use these 
philosophical writings to articulate some what may be felt to be genuine alternatives 
to my preferred view, and to lend plausibility to my view by showing their 
weaknesses.  
 
4. Style and aesthetic education 
To summarise, I have tried to show that stylistic representation is a type of 
representation. I argued for a thesis of literary stylistic representation based on the 
writings of Virginia Woolf: a literary style represents a set of cognitive dispositions. 
The cognitive dispositions that I discussed here had chiefly to do with how we 
make sense of other people’s characters and thought processes, and the main 
example I used was that of Mrs. Dalloway. The next step for the theory would be to 
investigate to what extent it is applicable to other examples of literary style and 
other kinds of dispositions. Prima facie, however, there seems to be no obvious 
reason why the theory ought not to be generalizable in this way. If we are happy to 
grant that the modernist style of writing can open up new ways of thinking about 
people’s characters, it should not be too difficult to show that other innovations in 
literary style can foster new cognitive dispositions for thinking about relationships, 
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political institutions, religion, mortality, and indeed any topic that literature can 
address. The key point is that literary works do not represent propositions about 
these matters, but cognitive dispositions that have to do with how the reader 
actively perceives these matters: dispositions to privilege certain aspects of life over 
others, to pick out certain features as more salient than others, to reserve certain 
kinds of effective responses for those features. 
 By means of conclusion I want to say something about the broader interest 
of this thesis, specifically about the implication the thesis may have for the question 
of whether and how works of literature can yield knowledge. While an investigation 
into the representative capacities of literary style may well be of interest in and of 
itself, I now hope to suggest that such a theory can also motivate a more ambitious 
claim about the kinds of aesthetic education that literature makes available. 
 The position that literature is valuable because it yields knowledge is sometimes 
known as 'cognitivism', and can be summarised as making these two claims: (i) 
literature is in part valuable because it is a source of significant knowledge, and (ii) 
literature makes that knowledge available in virtue of features that constitute its 
identity as literature. 35 The first claim explains the high regard we have for 
literature as an artform; literature, like philosophy or science, is a source of 
significant knowledge. ‘Knowledge’ here is usually broadly construed to include 
not just propositional knowledge, but other epistemically enhanced states like 
understanding, possession of a certain skill, and so on. The second claim needs to 
be met in order to ensure that the sort of knowledge made available by literature is 
made available non-accidentally, in virtue of specifically literary, artistic 
achievement. Uncontroversially, a work of literature can yield knowledge simply in 
virtue of any true descriptions it might contain, for example, about the historical 
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times and places it describes. The sort of knowledge we are trying to capture needs 
to be tied more closely to specifically literary art, to something that sets literature 
apart from ‘straightforward’ history and reportage. 
 The goal of cognitivism, then, is to show that there is such a thing as a 
specifically literary, specifically aesthetic education. The theory of literary style I 
canvassed above, I now want to suggest, can supply the groundwork for making 
good such a claim. It is beyond my means here to put forward anything like a fully-
fledged cognitivist theory; instead, I want to consider some steps which might get 
us there. 
 (1) First one would need to flesh out the sense in which a development of a 
stylistic representation constitutes a cognitive achievement, and the sense in which 
that achievement gets transferred to the reader. The first of these claims seems easy 
enough. Writing in a given a literary style is not merely a matter of choosing from 
an array of options; a style is something that an author hones and develops. Woolf 
writes eloquently on the difficulty of breaking with the preceding literary 
conventions; conventions, which have become so ossified as to seem natural;36 and 
so we might compare the cognitive achievement of creating a new style to the 
achievement of a philosopher who formulates a good alternative to a prevailing 
position. Importantly, however, one would also have to argue that this achievement 
gets transferred to the reader in the process of appreciating the new style – that there 
is a kind of learning that takes place through the reading. The crucial claim to make 
here is that the reader is not only able to recognize the cognitive disposition which a 
new style represents, but that she is able to acquire that disposition through the 
appreciation of the new style: that through reading she acquires an ability to see the 
world anew, as it were.  
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I have suggested above that we might be able to understand the effects of 
literary style on our cognition as a kind of ‘anchoring’ of our cognitive biases.37 
Psychologists have shown that random pieces of information can heavily influence 
our numerical and other estimations if they are relayed to us immediately prior to 
the guess. Perhaps works written in a distinct literary style, though describing 
fictional events irrelevant to our immediate environment, can similarly train us in 
obtaining specific thinking patterns, causing us to privilege certain kinds of 
information over other. (As a test, try reading a few paragraphs of Mrs Dalloway 
and then think of people you know). Perhaps the notion of cognitive anchoring may 
help us see how a kind of learning is taking place through literary style; a proper 
and thorough description of any such process, however, is still outstanding. 
 (2) If we could formulate a model of learning through style in a satisfactory 
way, how would it score against the two conditions imposed by cognitivism? The 
second condition - that literature must make knowledge available in virtue of 
features that are part of the literary art - would be easy enough to meet. A literary 
style is a characteristically literary trait, and so any knowledge made available 
through stylistic innovation would have to be put down to a specifically aesthetic 
education. To be able to fully subscribe to that claim, however, a difficult but 
essential step is missing. We would need to show that the cognitive achievement 
available through literary style leaves one epistemically better off. Perhaps works of 
literature do offer us new ways of organizing information and perceiving the world; 
but what makes any one of these a case of significant knowledge, rather than just an 
optional, non-veridical take on the information out there?  
In order to decide on this question, one would have to make clear what kind 
of truth different stylistic representations are allegedly tracking. Should we say that 
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either the Edwardians or the Georgians got it right, at the expense of the other 
party? Or can we tell a more complex story, suggesting that the truths of these 
different outlooks are complementary, or perhaps suggest that they are historically 
indexed? Once we make good the position that literary styles can educate our 
cognitive habits we are only halfway to a theory of aesthetic education; a more 
complete theory would require an exploration of the deeper epistemological and 
metaphysical commitments at play. 
 (3) Lastly, exploring the question of style would be fruitful in the context of 
the cognitivist theories about literature already on offer. Several models of literary 
knowledge have been developed in the past two decades or so; these include claims 
that literature yields practical moral knowledge, knowledge ‘from-within’ or ‘what 
it is like’, and education of emotions. For the most part, however, these models 
have been developed with regard to aspects of literary work other than the work's 
overall artistic style. Thus, for example, Martha Nussbaum has employed an 
Aristotelian framework to argue that a rich description of characters’ moral 
reasoning enhances our moral understanding;38 Noël Carroll has written on how 
novels use contrasting literary characters to bring out finer distinctions of virtue and 
vice;39 Berys Gaut has argued that works of literature can, much like good 
philosophical examples, enhance de se imaginings that yield knowledge of what it 
is like to be in a particular situation;40and Jenefer Robinson has tried to show that 
engaging the reader in characters’ fates can morally educate our emotions.41 
 At this point, I will leave it to the reader to consider whether there might be 
affinities between any of these views and the theory of stylistic representation I 
have been defending. My main aim so far has been to canvass the possibility that 
literary style is another means of representation - albeit a means of representing 
 27 
 
cognitive dispositions rather than a means of representing facts. If my derivations 
from Woolf are at all convincing, such a view is not entirely without precedent. 
And while a theory of stylistic representation is not the whole story as far as a full 
cognitivist thesis is concerned, it might be a good first step.42 
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